In this paper, we examine the optimal policies for the central government in a federation of jurisdictions, when the jurisdictions may differ in some characteristic which is private information to the jurisdiction's own government. We suppose this characteristic to be its taste for public spending Why should such differences among jurisdictions matter? Consider first the conditions for a first-best optimum i.e. the allocation a central planner would implement if the planner had perfect information, and was constrained only by the exogenous allocation of people to jurisdictions. The planner must choose several variables. The allocation of the fixed national capital stock among jurisdictions determines the aggregate national output. Then, given this output, the planner must decide how to divide it up among the jurisdictions, and how each jurisdiction's allocation of output is to be split between the private and public goods. We analyze this first-best problem formally below. But the first-order conditions should not be surprising. Maximization of aggregate output entails allocating capital so that the value of its marginal product is equal in all jurisdictions. And efficiency in consumption requires each jurisdiction's consumption vector to satisfy the Samuelson condition, that the sum of the ( identical ) residents' marginal rates of substitution between the public and private good equal the marginal rate of transformation between the two goods.
What happens under tax competition? If jurisdictions are the same, then the first of these two sets of optimality conditions is satisfied in a symmetric Nash equilibrium ( when there is no central planner ). The second set of conditions is not : public goods are underprovided. However, if jurisdictions differ in their taste for public expenditure, neither set of optimality conditions hold. In a sense, two distortions must be corrected by the central planner. And the method by which the planner's optimum might be implemented shows why informational asymmetries may be important.
To see this, suppose that the central planner were able to levy a national capital tax, which would be non-distortionary given the assumed fixity of the national capital stock. It could then allocate to each jurisdiction's government a grant, the grant precisely equalling the level of public expenditure satisfying the Samuelson condition for that jurisdiction ( given the jurisidction's tastes, and its income net of the national tax ). If each jurisdiction's government chose to spend the amount of the grant ( no more, and no less ) on its public consumption, then the resulting allocation would be first-best Pareto-optimal.
Of course, other allocations would be optimal. But the one just described has the appealing property that each jurisdiction's government would be willing to do as ordered, namely to spend the grant on the public good. Any other system of grants would leave some jurisdiction wishing to augment the grant, or to spend some of it on private goods. Given that the only fiscal instrument available to a jurisdiction's government is the source-based capital tax or subsidy, the jurisdictions' response would be inconsistent with Pareto optimality. In other words, if jurisdictions retain the ability to levy source-based taxes ( and only those taxes ), the grant scheme described above is the only first-best allocation the central planner can implement.
But notice how these grants differ by jurisdiction. Jurisdictions with a strong taste for public spending will receive larger grants. If this taste for public expenditure is not common knowledge, there is a clear incentive for a jurisdiction to overstate its taste. ( Raff and Wilson ( 1996 ) show that similar incentives exist in the Wildasin ( 1991 ) model of labour tax competition. )
Instead of focusing on different taste for public spending as a basis for asymmetric information, we could as well use differences in needs that are not observable by higher-level governments. These needs are usually measured by some easily-verified statistics, such as population, proportion of school-age population, and so on. But these variables are often just proxies for this need. And the jurisdictions' governments usually exert considerable effort to try and convince central governments that the "true" measures of need are indices for which their own jurisdiction scores high. The complaints by New York City's politicians that the U.S. census systematically under-counts their population is an example of this behaviour. So was the Congressional debate over the formula for general revenue-sharing in the 1960's. So even if the central planner has the same data about many of its jurisdictions' characteristics as do the lower levels of government, they may be unsure of the relation between those data and the true determinants of public sector demand. The lowerlevel politicians, who actually provide the public goods, may have a far better konowledge of these determinants, but clear incentives to misrepresent them.
In this paper, we derive the optimal incentive-compatible grant programmes for the federal government, when jurisdictional governments have private information. We assume, as in the discussion above, that the federal government is able to commit to its policy. That is, the federal government moves first, and then jurisdictional governments move simultaneously. Formally, the federal government then acts as a principal, and the jurisdictional governments are agents. Recently, there have been several applications of the principal-agent model to the structure of federal grants, among them Boadway, Horiba and Jha ( 1994 ) , Bordignon, Manasse and Tabellini ( 1996 ) , Cornes and Silva ( 1996 ), Lockwood ( 1996 ) and Raff and Wilson ( 1996 ) . Our paper is diffentiated from most of these others in several respects.
There is first the nature of the asymmetric information. All of the above-mentioned papers, except for Lockwood ( 1996 ) , assume that the jurisdictions' governments have private information about some sort of cost parameter. We assume here that the taste of the jurisdiction for public expenditure is the private information. There are at least two respects in which we find this sort of information asymmetry to be worth considering. First, like these other papers, we treat the jurisdictional decision-maker as a single agent. If residents of the jurisdiction elect that agent, then it is natural to assume that the person who gets elected is the person who has the best knowledge of the preferences of the electors. The likely comparative advantage of a successful local politician is to follow the preferences of the local voters. National politicians must allocate their limited information-gathering resources over a larger set of voters.
Also, it is differences in preferences of voters among different jurisdictions that motivates much of the unease with economic integration. Many observers are worried about the ability of jurisdictions with a high taste for redistribution to exercise that taste in a highly-integrated federation. Lopez, Marchand and Pestieau ( 1996 ) , for example, show tax competition's perverse implications for redistribution activity when jurisdictions differ in their taste for redistribution. Here, the jurisdiction's public expenditure category can be interpreted as a transfer from the rich to the poor. And we do derive some explicit results as to how the optimal federal grant structure affects the jurisdictions' redistribution activities.
There are other respects in which our paper differs from most of the emerging literature.
Unlike Boadway, Horiba and Jha, or Cornes and Silva, we do not consider any moral hazard problems.
1 That is, there will be no "hidden actions" available to our jurisdictional governments.
It might however be thought that the absence of hidden actions makes our problem a very standard principal-agent model, formally equivalent to the most basic models in Laffont and Tirole ( 1993 ) , or to Stiglitz's ( 1982 ) formulation of the optimal income tax problem. That is not quite the case, because of the nature of capital tax competition among jurisdictions. The inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium in the absence of a federal government arises because jurisdictions must use the source-based capital tax to finance their public sector. In the models of Wilson ( 1986 ) or Zodrow and Mieszkowski ( 1986 ) for instance, the Nash equilibrium would be efficient if each jurisdiction could levy a residence-based tax on capital income, or a head tax, or a wage income tax. This efficiency would arise even if jurisdictions were free to levy source-base capital taxes as well. In the symmetric Nash equilibrium they would choose not to do so. Tax instruments at the jurisdiction level are also restricted in Lockwood (1996) to a distortionary tax on consumption.
In his model, jurisdictions are subject to taste or technology shocks that are private information of the jurisdictions and there are public good spillovers between them. By transferring resources across jurisdictions the central government plays both as an insurer and as a coordinator of local public provision, and Lockwood shows that at the optimum the central government fullfils both these roles imperfectly. A similar conclusion will be reached in the present paper.
In keeping with the spirit of those models, we as well restrict the instruments available to governments. Of course in our model, as in those others, wage taxes or head taxes are nondistortionary and have no adverse distributional effects. There is no obvious reason, in the setting of the model, why jurisdictional governments would choose not to use them. But we know that there are drawbacks to these tax instruments in more realistic models. Wage taxation distorts the labour-leisure choice when it is endogenous, and a head tax is highly regressive when agents differ within a jurisdiction. Governments in the real world do choose to levy source-based capital taxes, and they are concerned about the tax competition caused by mobility of capital.
2 Here then, we restrict all governments, jurisdictional or federal, to source-based capital taxation as revenue source.
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In what follows, we first present the model and derive both the laissez-faire equilibrium and the optimality conditions for a first-best allocation. This is an allocation that a perfectly informed central planner could achieve if lump-sum instruments were available. Such first-best allocation is of interest as a benchmark. Then in Section 3 we turn to the second-best problem. In this problem the planner knows the distribution of the jurisdictional taste parameter but ignores its value for any specific jurisdiction. The planner is restricted as well by the available tax instruments. The properties of the second-best solution are first analyzed for a Benthamite social welfare function and for individual preferences that are quasi-linear in private consumption, and then some of them are generalized to any social welfare function and any preferences. Section 4 provides further insights in the solution of the above second-best problem by means of a numerical example in which it is compared to that of the simplest second-best problem, where the restriction on tax instruments is deleted. The last section concludes the paper with a few remarks.
The Model
A nation contains a "large" number of jurisdictions, so large that no jurisdiction's unilateral action has any effect on the national return to capital. Each resident of each jurisdiction has an endowment ofk units of capital, and supplies one unit of labour. Capital is perfectly mobile among jurisdictions ; labour is perfectly immobile.
Each jurisdiction has the same population, normalized to 1. said above. A homogeneous output is produced in each jurisdiction, using the same production technology. Production uses capital and labour as inputs, under constant returns to scale said below. Labour is immobile among jurisdictions. The constant returns to scale imply the quantity of output produced in a jurisdiction is f (k) if a per-worker quantity k of capital is employed, where the intensive-form production function f (k) is increasing and strictly concave. The output may be transformed into either a private good or a public good. The marginal rate of transformation is 1 for both.
There are two types of people in the nation, those with a high taste for the public good, and those with a low taste for the public good. People are immobile, and have already been sorted into homogeneous jurisdictions.
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A resident of type i has a utility function u i (y, g) defined over consumption of the private good, y, and consumption of the public good, g. A person of type H has an unambiguously higher taste for the public good than a person of type L. Therefore
That is, preferences obey the "single-crossing" property. Indifference curves are steeper for lowtaste jurisdictions than for high-taste ones in a diagram with y on the horizontal axis and g on the vertical axis. In fact, considerable attention will be devoted to the case where preferences are quasi-linear in y. In that case, one has:
with v(g) increasing and concave, and with
Note that the income elasticity of public good demand is then equal to 0.
There are N L jurisdictions with low-taste people and N H with high-taste people. It will prove convenient to work with the proportions of the overall population that have given tastes :
The central planner knows n L and n H but not the type of any specific jurisdiction. The only allocations we consider are those which treat all low-taste people the same as each other, and all high-taste people the same as each other. Then a feasible allocation is simply a vector
Equations (2) and (3) define only the physical constraints faced by this nation. The problem which we analyze also imposes additional constraints : restrictions on the tax instruments that governments may use, and incentive-compatibility constraints due to information asymmetries concerning the tastes of the residents of any given jurisdiction.
The only tax instrument available to the government of any jurisdiction is a tax on the quantity of capital employed within the jurisdiction. Let t i denote this source-based specific tax on capital in jurisdiction i. The federal government can levy a tax on capital employed in the whole nation, at rate T . It also can make transfers to regions. Let s i denote the grant (or transfer) to jurisdiction i. This grant can be based only on what the central planner observes, that is the capital tax rate t i chosen by the jurisdiction. Therefore, the grant policy must satisfy the self-selection constraints.
If the federal government's policy involves low-taste jurisdictions choosing a capital tax rate t L , and getting a grant of s L , then each low-taste jurisdiction must prefer that policy to the analogous policy (t H , s H ) chosen for the high-taste jurisdictions ( and vice-versa ).
The federal government's policy instruments are the grants s i to the public sector of each jurisdiction and the national capital tax rate T . Indirectly, it also controls the capital tax rates t i for each type of jurisdiction. The federal government chooses its policy before the jurisdiction's governments choose their actions, and it commits to its policy -as is standard in principal-agent problems. Then the jurisdictions choose their policies simultaneously, taking as given the federal government's policy. Our solution concept is quite standard. We look for a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.
Turning to the last stage of the game, we look first at the allocation of capital among jurisdictions. As is usual in models of this sort, it is assumed that perfect competition prevails in production, so that each factor is paid the value of its marginal product. Perfect mobility of capital implies that it earns the same return, net of all source-based taxes, in each jurisdiction in which it is employed. The net return to capital in a jurisdiction of type i, if there is a quantity k i of capital employed there, is f (
where we denote by ρ this common net return to capital. Equations (2) and (4) determine the allocation of capital ( and hence this net return ) as function of the source-based taxes levied in the two jurisdictions.
Increasing a jurisdiction's tax rate t i serves to reduce the amount of capital employed in that jurisdiction, increase the amount of capital employed in every other jurisdiction, and reduce the net return to capital. What will matter to the federal government will be the effect of changing the tax rate in all the jurisdictions of a given type. Recall that we have assumed that there are many jurisdictions of each type, and that the central government is considering only policies which treat all agents of a given type the same. So the partial derivatives below refer to the effects of changing the tax rate in all N L low-taste jurisdictions, or in all N H high-taste jurisdictions. From equations (2) and (4), we obtain
with analogous expressions for the effects of changing the tax rate in all the high-taste jurisdictions.
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As said earlier, the Nash equilibrium in an environment without central government has been examined previously in the literature, and it involves under-provision of the public good in each jurisdiction. That is, the marginal rate of substitution of the public good for the private good exceeds 1 in each type of jurisdiction in this Nash equilibrium. Each jurisdiction's government misallocates its output between the two goods relative to the first-best outcome. But the Nash equilibrium also involves an inefficient allocation of capital when the two types of region differ in taste. The total output of the nation is less than it could be. Therefore the federal government would like to alter the allocation from this Nash equilibrium allocation in two ways : it would like to get each type of jurisdiction to increase its public good provision, and it would like to get the two types of jurisdiction to levy tax rates on capital which are closer together.
If the federal government were constrained only by the "physical" constraints (2) and (3), then it could implement a first-best allocation. A solution to the first-best problem is derived by maximizing the utility of the low-taste type, subject to the high-taste type attaining at least some exogenous utility level, and constrained only by the feasibility conditions (2) and (3). This maximization yields three first-order conditions, all very familiar :
5 In contrast, if there were no central government, and each jurisdiction acted on its own, then the effect of a region increasing its tax rate unilaterally would be ∂k i /∂t i = 1/f (k i ), with increases in t i having no impact on the net return to capital ρ. This comes from our assumption that the number of jurisdictions is large (litteraly, infinite).
Equation (8) is the first-order condition for maximization of national output, that the mobile factor's marginal product be the same everywhere. Note that it can be satisfied in a competitive economy, in which capital is perfectly mobile, only if source-based taxes are the same everywhere.
in any ( sub-optimal ) allocation, then any movement of capital from the low-taste jurisdictions to the high-taste jurisdictions will increase national output.
Equations (9) and (10) are the Samuelson conditions for the provision of the public good ( recall that the population of each jurisdiction has been set equal to 1 ). As in the description of the no-federal-government Nash equilibrium, a jurisdiction will be said to "under-supply" the public good if and only if its marginal rate of substitution u g /u y exceeds 1, and to "over-supply" if that MRS is less than 1.
Note that if instead of seeking a Pareto optimal solution, the planner was aiming at maximizing a Benthamite social welfare function, the solution would also imply the equality of marginal utilities:
This solution is one specific allocation from the continuum of feasible allocations which satisfy the Pareto optimality conditions (8)- (10), except if preferences are quasi-linear in private consumption.
In such a case, equations (9) and (10) determine g L and g H uniquely and in a simple way:
The additional Benthamite requirement that the marginal utilities of private consumption be equal is then satisfied by definition. 
The Solution Under Asymmetric Information and Tax Competition.
The federal government is viewed here as a central planner, which chooses its policy instru-
where the consumption vectors are determined by the allocation of capital and the jurisdiction's budget contraints:
and
with the allocation of capital k i and its net return ρ depending on the jurisdictions' tax rates, as discussed in the previous section [ see (4)- (7) ]. In objective (11), λ L and λ H are positive welfare weights the ratio of which can be changed to characterize the various second-best allocations. Implicit in equation (12) is that perfect competition prevails in the jurisdiction, and that each resident of the jurisdiction is paid a wage equal to the marginal product of labour.
One of the five tax instruments chosen or controlled by the central planner is however redundant. The planner actually has an extra degree of freedom. To see this, consider any policy instrument vector (t L , t H , s L , s H , T ). This vector gives rise to an allocation (k L , k H ) of capital. Increasing both t L and t H by some will not alter this allocation of capital. Then decreasing s i by k i will leave each g i unchanged. The net return ρ to capital will have fallen by due to the equal increases in t L and t H . This resulting fall in each person's private income y i is k . But the decrease in T is
which exactly equals k , so that the change in the policy vector from (
has not affected the allocation. Because of this redundancy, one of the policy instruments, namely t H , will be set at some arbitrary value.
In addition to (12) and (13), the central planner is constrained by the self-selection constraints of the jurisdictions' policy-makers. Each jurisdiction must prefer its "correct" tax-grant combination (t i , s i ) to that of the other type of jurisdiction. Since there are many jurisdictions of each type, and each jurisdiction is considering a unilateral deviation from its "correct" policy, the selection constraints are
Because each jurisdiction is contemplating a unilateral deviation, it regards the national capital tax T , and the national net return to capital ρ as given. Therefore, its private consumption y i is a monotonically decreasing function of its tax rate t i . Now if these selection constraints are satisfied, then the high-taste jurisdictions cannot levy a lower tax rate than the low-taste jurisdictions.
LEMMA 1 : If the selection constraints (14) and (15) The central planner's problem will first be solved for the special case, in which preferences are quasi-linear, and in which the central planner's social welfare function is Benthamite (λ L = λ H = 1). Although this is a very particular welfare measure, its solution gives some insight into the general case. Given the quasi-linear utilities, and the Benthamite social welfare function, the central planner seeks to maximize with respect to the tax rates and grants the following objective:
and the self-selection constraints (14) and (15).
Substituting for T from the federal government's budget constraint and for ρ from equation (4), relation (12) yields:
This is used to write the federal government's Lagrangian function:
in which µ L and µ H are the Lagrangian multipliers of the self-selection constraints, and k L and k H are functions of both t L and t H .
Differentiating (17) with respect to the grants given to low-taste and high-taste jurisdictions, one obtains the first-order conditions
The first-order condition with respect to the tax rate in the low-taste jurisdictions is
where we have used (4) and the fact that
and v (g L ) from equations (18) and (19), and using equations (5) and (6), equation (20) can be written in the much simpler form
From equations (18), (19) and (21) the following proposition can be proved :
PROPOSITION 1 : When the central planner's social welfare function is Benthamite, and people's preferences are quasi-linear in private comsumption, then at the optimum (i) the capital tax rate t H is strictly higher in the high-taste jurisdictions than the rate t L in the low-taste jurisdictions,
(ii) the selection constraint is binding on the low-taste jurisdictions and not on the high-taste jurisdictions, (iii) the low-taste jurisdictions over-supply the public good and the high-taste jurisdictions under-supply it.
PROOF : First, suppose that t L = t H so that there is a pooling solution and
and equation (19) implies
which contradicts the fact that α H > α L . So the assumption t L = t H cannot hold. Therefore part (i) of the proposition has been proved, and it has been demonstrated that the two types of jurisdiction must select distinct policies ; the optimum must separate them. Further, at least one selection constraint must bind. Equation (21) shows that if both µ i 's were zero, then the optimum would have to be a pooling solution, which has just been ruled out. The single-crossing condition then implies that exactly one selection constraint must bind. Since
The result that it is the low-taste type for which the selection constraint binds depends on the social welfare function chosen. Even with the quasi-linear preferences, the selection constraint may be binding for the high-taste type, or for neither type, if some other welfare function were chosen.
However, one result which does generalize to arbitrary Pareto optima and to arbitrary preferences ( subject to the single-crossing property ) is that the low-taste jurisdiction must over-provide the public good if the selection constraint is binding on it at the optimum. The reason for this result is to be found in the restriction on tax instruments causing capital to to be misallocated. Any move that reduces the gap between t H and t L increases aggregate output.
The argument is captured in figure 1 , in which private good consumption is on the horizontal axis and public good consumption is on the vertical axis. In this figure, inhabitants of the low-taste jurisdiction are indifferent between their consumption bundle (y L , g L ) and that consumed in the high-taste jurisdictions. In the figure, the MRS L is equal to 1. That property is indicated by the fact that the slope of the low-taste indifference curve through (y L , g L ) is minus unity. Then a move up and to the left from ( to the right of the tangency of the indifference curve with a 45-degree line, so that MRS L > 1, and the slope of u L were less than 1 in absolute value.
The key to the above argument is demonstrating that the move can be implemented by the central planner. The planner's policy instruments are not the consumption levels, but the taxes and grants. The proof of the following proposition given in the appendix demonstrates that the planner can achieve this move, and can do it while increasing the tax rate in the low-taste jurisdictions.
PROPOSITION 2 : The optimal policy separates the two type of jurisdictions with t H > t L . If the selection constraint is binding on the low-taste type at the optimum, then the low-taste jurisdiction must over-supply the public good. If the selection constraint is binding on the hightaste type, then the high-taste jurisdiction must under-supply the public good. If it binds on neither jurisdiction, then the low-taste jurisdiction over-supplies the public good and the hightaste jurisdiction under-supplies it.
These results hold without any restriction on the social welfare function and the jurisdictional preferences. Note also that overprovision of public goods by the low-taste jurisdiction (MRS L < 1) means that the slope of its indifference curve in Figure 1 is larger than 1 at the optimal bundle
Proposition 2 indicates that, in general, neither the high-taste and the low-taste jurisdictions' consumption bundles will be first-best optimal. No result of the no-distorsion-at-the-top type obtains here. This deviation from optimality at both ends of the taste distribution occurs as well in Lockwood ( 1996 ) . However there the low-taste jurisdictions under-provide the public good, and the high-taste jurisdictions over-provide because of the public good spillovers present in his model. Here, the differences between jurisdictions are "reduced" relative to the optimum, because reductions in the difference between tax rates raise national output. A similar sort of phenomenon occurs in general equilibrium models of optimal income taxation, most notably in Stiglitz ( 1982 ) when different types of labor are not perfect substitutes. There the marginal income tax rate at the top is negative, rather than zero as in the standard optimal income tax model, because the reduction in the top tax rate serves to improve redistribution through general equilibrium effects.
A Numerical Illustration
To interpret the results of the previous section, it is instructive to consider the two types of constraint imposed on the planner, in addition to the feasibility constraints (2) and (3). First, there are the restrictions (12) and (13) imposed by the reliance on source-based capital taxation.
Then there are the selection constraints (14) and (15) imposed by the asymmetries of information. What if only this second set of constraints applied?
If the planner was not informed about the type of any particular jurisdiction, but was able to use lump-sum taxes and grants [ i.e. if she were constrained by (14) and (15), but not by (12) or (13) ], then a fairly standard principal-agent problem results. The first-best optimality condition (8) on the allocation of capital would hold. And at least one of the first-best conditions (9) or (10) on the provision of public goods would hold, the one corresponding to the type for whom the selection constraint is binding.
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Moreover, the direction of movement from optimality for the other jurisdiction can be signed. If the selection constraint is binding on the low-taste types, then the high-taste jurisdiction will over-provide the public good. Exaggerating the jurisdiction's tendency for high public provision makes it less attractive for the low-taste types to emulate.
The above considerations are illustrated with a numerical example in Table 1 . This example uses the following specification: (i) the non-linear utility function is "log CobbDouglas", u(y, g) = (1 − α) ln y + α ln g, with α = 0, 2 for low-taste jurisdictions and α = 0, 7 for high-taste jurisdictions, (ii) the production function is quadratic, f (k) = 100k − k 2 , and (iii)
there are equal numbers of jurisdictions of the two types (n L = n H ), each being inhabited by one individual endowed with one unit of capital, k = 1. The results in Table 1 have been obtained
with each column corresponding to a different value of λ L . The first part of Table 1 provides the results for the second-best problem considered at the beginning of the present section, in which the restriction on the tax instruments is deleted. As expected, as one increases the relative weight of low-taste jurisdictions in the objective function (i.e. as one moves from left to right in the table), the selection constraint is first binding on lowtaste jurisdictions, then on high-taste ones. However, it is worth noting that in the second column (λ L = 0.5), the optimal solution is such that MRS L = MRS H = 1 and so corresponds to a firstbest. Near this relative weight there is a range of pairs (u L , u H ) for which the second-best frontier of utility possibilities moves along the first-best frontier (neither selection constraint binds). So three regimes can be distinguished:
(1) the selection constraint binds on low-taste jurisdictions, and MRS L = 1 > MRS H ; (2) neither selection constraint binds, and MRS L = 1 = MRS H ; (3) the selection constraint binds on high-taste jurisdictions, and MRS L > 1 = MRS H . The restriction on tax instruments changes radically these characterisations. First of all, the first-best optimality condition cannot be satisfied for a jurisdiction for which the constraint is binding. Secondly, the tendency to "exaggerate" differences in taste for the public good is reversed. In the special case of proposition 1, the optimum involves an over-provision of public goods ( relative to the first-best solution ) in the low-taste jurisdictions, and an under-provision in the high-taste jurisdictions. When t H > t L , any reduction in the difference between these capital tax rates will increase aggregate national output. It is the positive effects of that convergence which leads to the reduction in disparities in public good provision as well. This is illustrated in the second part of Table 1 , that provides the results for the secondbest problem with both asymmetry of information and restriction on tax instruments (t L is set to zero because one of the tax instruments is redundant). One can indeed observe that because of the distortionary nature of the source-based capital taxes, there is a reduction in the discrepancy between y L and y H (as compared to the first part of the table). As a consequence of this reduction, to keep the binding selection constraint satisfied there must be changes in g L and g H . As intuition suggests, these lead to a reduction in (g H −g L ), except however in the third column. This exception occurs because when the restriction on tax instruments is introduced, the jurisdictions on which the selection constraint binds change type in this case. There is one further insight provided by the second part of the table. The results of the two extreme columns show that at the optimum, one may simultaneously have in both regions either overspending or underspending on public goods. Therefore, with asymmetry of information and restriction on tax instruments one can distinguish five regimes characterized by:
(i) the selection constraint binds on the low-taste type, and both types of jurisdiction over-supply the public good,
(ii) the selection constraint binds on the low-taste type, and
(iii) neither selection constraint is binding, and
(iv) the selection constraint binds on the high-taste type, and
the selection constraint binds on the high-taste type, and both types of jurisdiction undersupply the public good.
When both asymmetry of information and restriction on tax instruments are present, we have t L = t H from Proposition 2. That means that aggregate output per jurisdiction is less than f (k). The frontier of utility possibilities is then everywhere inside the second-best frontier obtained with only the self-selection constraints.
Conclusions
This paper has considered a federation in which local jurisdictions are identical in every respect except in their taste for public spending and in which each jurisdiction finances its public spending by a source-based tax on capital income. In the absence of any corrective action by the federal government, the tax rate levied in the high-taste jurisdicitions is higher than in the low-taste ones, implying that the country's capital endowment is misallocated between the two types of jurisdictions. Furthermore, the Samuelson Rule for optimal balance between private and public consumption is generally violated in both types of jurisdictions. It is always the case that in the high-taste ones, too much is spend on private consumption and too little on public consumption.
The purpose of the central government is then to reduce the above inefficiencies (due to the capital misallocation and the violation of Samuelson Rule) by making differential grants to the jurisdictions. These grants must be spent for public consumption by jurisdictions, and they are financed by a non-distortionary federal tax levied on capital income. Quite intuitively, this grant should be larger for high-taste jurisdictions. However, as a jurisdiction's well-being is strictly increasing in the grant it receives, under asymmetric information there cannot be an equilibrium in which jurisdictions levy the same tax rate but get different grants since every jurisdiction wants to be of the type getting the high grant.
It turns out that a high source-based tax levied on capital income by a jurisdiction is a way of signalling its high taste for public consumption, and at the optimum the federal government wants to use that signal, which is bound to lead to a misallocation of capital across jurisdictions. The federal government trades off this misallocation against the misallocation of jurisdictional expenditures between private and public consumption. It is precisely to characterize this trade-off which is the central focus of this paper. Unlike the standard principal-agent model there are two sets of first-order conditions to satisfy for a first-best solution, and too few policy instruments for the principal to play with. Therefore, at the optimum, even if the selection constraint is not binding on a type of jurisdictions, none of the first-order conditions for optimality need generally hold.
Appendix : Proof of Proposition 2.
To prove Proposition 2, we need first to demonstrate three lemmas.
LEMMA 2: For any feasible set of policy instruments (
is part of the definition of feasibility. Condition (ii) is a normalization, using the fact that one of the instruments is redundant.
Since
where we have used the fact that ρ = f (k H ) − t H , and conditions (ii) and (iii). If dy H = 0, then equations (A1) and (A2) imply
= 0, which means that (A4) can be written 
The proof of this lemma proceeds in exactly the same manner as that of lemma 2. These lemmas can help establish the following. LEMMA 1' : At the planner's optimum, t H > t L .
PROOF : Suppose to the contrary that t L = t H and s L = s H at the optimum. If both
MRS
i 's were greater than 1, then a slight increase in the common tax rate would be a Paretoimprovement. If both MRS i 's were less than 1, then a slight decrease in the common tax rate would be a Pareto-improvement.
Suppose next that MRS
H ≥ 1, and MRS L < 1. Consider the policy change exactly opposite to that described in lemma 2 -a decrease in t L and in g L . The change in overall output is
which will be arbitrarily close to zero here, since initially f
equals the overall change in output. Since this can be made arbitrarily small, and MRS L < 1 ≤ MRS H , the change can be chosen so that
Thus the feasible change has not violated either selection constraint, and has made the low-taste type strictly better off.
The final possibility is MRS L = 1 and MRS H > 1. In this case, a move exactly opposite to that described in lemma 3 will make the high-taste types strictly better off, without violating the selection constraints. Therefore, a Pareto improvement has been constructed on every possible outcome in which t L = t H , proving the lemma.
The first assertion of Proposition 2 is therefore proved, and we are ready to proceed with the rest of its proof.
PROOF: Suppose first that the selection constraint binds on the low-taste jurisdictions, and suppose that MRS L ≥ 1. Consider a small change, of the type described in lemma 2. The net change in output resulting from such a change is 
from the assumptions that dg L > 0 and MRS L ≥ 1. The change makes the low-taste people better off. If it is small enough, it will not violate the selection constraints, since the constraint was not binding originally on the high-taste types.
Therefore, the original situation, as depicted in figure 1 , cannot have been a Pareto optimum. If instead the selection constraint bound on the high-taste type, and MRS H were less than or equal to 1, then a change described in lemma 3 would make high-taste people better off without altering the utility of low-taste people.
Finally, if neither constraint bound, then changes of either type, lemma 2 or lemma 3, would cause a Pareto improvement if MRS L ≥ 1 or MRS H ≤ 1, completing the proof of the proposition.
